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Abstract 
This paper studies the evolution of the economic man (Homo Economicus) from its 
original conception till current day. By analyzing the discourse of economic articles, 
we provide a chronological account of the economic man’s intellectual and 
philosophical development as it evolved from what we term as the philosophical age 
to the neo-classical age and finally to the strategic age. The paper then shows how 
the economic man in the strategic age is slowly finding convergence with the 
sociological man (Homo Sociologicus). A reconciliation of the two sapiens is difficult. 
However, recent papers on behavioral and experimental economics provide insights 
into a possible reconciliation. Our study argues that the purpose of the sociological 
man is to identify who he is, how he interacts with people within a society and the 
antecedents to such behaviors. Homo-Economicus, however, has no overarching 
philosophical assumptions on what he values. The objectives of each discipline are 
different and once one is mapped on to the other, it is unclear if there is truly any 
tension between them. 
 
 
I 
 
Introduction 
 
THIS PAPER STUDIES THE EVOLUTION of the economic man (Homo Economicus) 
from its original conception by John Stuart Mill and Adam Smith till current day. By 
analyzing the discourse of economic articles, we provide a chronological account of 
the economic man’s intellectual and philosophical development as it evolved from 
what we term as the philosophical age to the neo-classical age and finally to the 
strategic age.  
The philosophical age saw the formation of Homo Economicus and the 
development of its ideological foundations including its most enduring axioms of self-
interest and rational behaviors. As the economic man journeyed into neo-classical 
economics, he became an analytical tool for the prediction of outcomes and a model 
for the self-interested utility maximizer operating with finite resources within a society. 
The neo-classical age also saw spin-offs of the economic man to behavioral, 
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contractual and social dimensions as criticisms were heaped upon its original 
concept. Our study discusses the criticisms and show how, as the economic man 
enters the strategic age, issues such as social norms, interactive choice, learning and 
cooperation take center stage as economists strive for a more robust formulation of 
Homo Economicus. 
The paper then shows how the discourses in economics are allowing Homo 
Economicus to find convergence with the sociological man (Homo Sociologicus), as 
the former loses its philosophical and ontological assumptions. We survey the 
literatures of phenomenology, social constructionism and role theory to illustrate the 
entity of Homo Sociologicus, and examine the fundamental and theoretical issues that 
arise when attempting to reconcile the two. It is difficult to reconcile the two sapiens, 
because the study of economics view man as atomistic and self-interested,  while 
sociology views man as one whose identity and actions are defined by his role in 
society. However, game theoretic models provide insights into a possible 
reconciliation. That is, if the payoffs of economic man’s choice are not based on his 
own preference or his own judgment, but are determined by how he is able to predict 
the collective choice. Then the question of how he devotes his social intelligence to 
anticipate what the collective choice would be becomes the focus of consideration in 
maximizing his payoffs. In this case, while the motivation is self-interest in nature, the 
economic man must become more socially intelligent through learning and 
understanding the roles of various players in society. Therefore, interactive choice 
and iterated models of learning and thinking could be viewed as antecedents to role 
behavior expounded in sociology. The difference between Homo Economicus and 
Homo Sociologicus is therefore not about the assumptions of human nature, contrary 
to popular belief. As we argue here, the evolved Homo Economicus in the strategic 
age does not have any assumptions about human nature - merely that an individual is 
self-interested - nor has he any overarching philosophical assumptions on what he 
values. Hence, we claim that an individual can be both Homo Economicus in terms of 
his behavior while retaining the ontological assumptions of Homo Sociologicus. 
 
 
 
II 
 
Literature Review 
 
HOMO ECONOMICUS IS A CORNERSTONE on which economic theories are built 
on and its concept was thought to be submitted by John Stuart Mill in 1836 (Persky, 
1995). For Mill, economic man is “…solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, 
and who is capable of judging the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that 
end (p.321)”. Although Mill pointed out that the central idea of economic man is the 
link between efficient means and wealth, the meaning of wealth is not merely in 
attaining material pleasures. Other goals such as accumulation, leisure, luxury and 
procreation are also embedded in the pursuit of “wealth” (Persky, 1995). Therefore, 
the economic man is one who judges the comparative efficacy of means to obtain 
wealth, as well as seeking to maximize pleasure. Adam Smith’s seminal work (1776) 
suggested that by merely acting on his own self-interest, he can unintentionally 
promote public interests. Yet, his freedom of pursuing self-interested gains is not 
unbounded (Grampp, 1948), because a free market can work well only when the 
divisions of labor and unfettered competition are built on a civilized society (Coase, 
1976; Kaufman, 2002). This is similar in tone to Hobbes’ (1947) work insofar as he 
posited that human nature is self interested and some people are thought to be 
“sorely profit pursuing” (1969), which could be taken as an early germ of the homo 
economicus (Moss, 2002). However, Hobbes’ view is different from classical 
economics from the point of view of spontaneous social order. In classical economics, 
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social order could be achieved by the “invisible hand”. Hobbes’ felt that sovereign 
power and punishments are necessary to achieve order and peace.  
As economic man journeyed into neo-classical economics, maximizing wealth and 
pleasure took on the more generic term of maximizing utility, often described as 
benefits for the individual. Hence, as Mises (1996) noted, human action (and 
therefore economic theory) can only be understood when aprioristic views of human 
nature (as self interested) is mapped onto the actions. This is similar to Robbins 
(1932, 1945). In An Essay On the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, 
Robbins claimed  that “Economics is the science which studies human behavior as a 
relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses” (Robbins, 
1945, pp.16), Robbins deemed that economic reasoning is a neutral process, which 
means economics is about what is rather then what ought to be and that, as a 
science, economic theory is applicable to various situation depending on the extent 
which concepts accurately reflect the actual situation. Robbins therefore makes a 
case for the kind of deductive methodology that makes economics different from other 
natural and social sciences. 
When such a deductive methodology is employed in economic analysis, the 
economic man is usually assumed to be perfectly rational. He (the economic man) is 
able to predict every possible outcome for all his choices, and his decision will be the 
one that will maximize his utility (Weale, 1992; Schneider, 1974). Without 
complications such as personality, value, belief, and emotions, economic man’s 
behavior can be explained by his own self-interested orientation. Other elements such 
as social norms are akin to rules of the game - economic man maximizes his utility 
within these rules. In economics therefore, the definition of the game rules can define 
the boundary of economic man’s behavior, but does not change the fact that 
economic man will always be self-interested. In other words, for the economic man, 
even sacrifice is driven by self-interest. Although some may argue that the concept is 
unrealistic, it served as a powerful analytical tool in neo-classical economics (Knight 
1941).  
Economic man is not without its critics, especially when empirical observations of 
human behavior seemed to contradict the predictions (Beckert, 1996; Mueller, 2004). 
Some argued that the concept of economic man is too narrow, as self-interest is not 
the only motivation, and people are often driven by social norms as well (Dahrendorf, 
1968). Others claim that the ability to learn quickly is suspect as people often make 
the same mistakes. Simon (1957, 1972, and 1976) pointed out that human beings’ 
rationalities are bounded. Taking man as omniscience is unrealistic and cannot 
credibly explain real phenomena. In addition, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) found 
that behaviors are not always consistent with rational economic theory. Their studies 
showed that most people will act irrationally, but lean toward loss aversion. Benartzi 
and Thaler (1995) proposed the concept of “myopic loss aversion” to illustrate that 
people will weigh a unit of loss to be greater than a unit of gain. Benartzi and Thaler’s 
(1995) work brought forward the need for psychological consideration in traditional 
economics. Some argue that economists draw too many conclusions from mere 
behavior and ignore the antecedents to such behaviors. The theory of planned 
behavior (Ajzen’s 1991) suggests that one’s behavior is determined by one’s 
intention, and one’s intention is determined by his attitudes toward the behavior, 
subjective norms, and his perception of difficulty in performing the behavior. Thus, it 
isn’t enough to merely predict outcomes based on behavior, but to also explain why 
people behave the way they do.  
This orientation was also proposed by Mises’ (1996) who felt that most important 
theorems in economics could be explained by the assumption that human behavior is 
purposeful.Although Mises’ (1996) view of human nature is similar to Robbins’ (1945) 
Mises argued that economists should deal with the real actions of real people and not 
build their theories on the basis of some utopian economic man (Kirzner, 1976, 2000). 
In Human Action, Mises (1996, pp.236-237) disagreed with the assumption of 
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rationality. In his view, human beings are individually different and always with 
weaknesses.  
In addition, some scholars do not take self-interest as a unique motivation for 
human behavior. For instance, Thompson’s (1971) research into the behavior of the 
English crowd in the 18th century found that it wasn’t only “rebellions of belly” that 
caused the food riots; the notion of legitimation to the riots also played a dominant 
role in causing them. In addition, other issues such as moral codes (Sen, 1982), 
social interdependence (Frank, 1985), social relation (Granovetter, 1985), institutions 
(Bowles, 1998), and emotion (Haidt, 2003) are seen to be associated with human 
behavior. Consequently, a self-interest orientation seems inadequate to explain 
outcomes. 
As the pressure on the economic man to provide better prediction of outcomes 
increased, economists moved into the strategic age through the use of game theory. 
Game theory studies the optimal choices made by individuals when the payoffs to the 
individual is not a constant, but is dependent on the choices of other individuals 
(Spiegler, 2005). And given the individuals’ rational choices, an equilibrium outcome 
is predicted (Nash 1951). Thus, interactive choice is a central issue in game theory 
(Harsanyi, 1995) and the economic man has evolved into a strategic being. For 
instance, the well-known prisoner’s dilemma game shows how a player makes his 
decision by taking the other player into account. A cooperative game shows how 
players make binding commitments to achieve pareto-optimality (Rasmusen, 2001), 
and a bargaining model with incomplete information shows how players’ initial beliefs 
about other players will affect their choices (Rubinstein, 1985). Players need to form 
beliefs when information structure is incomplete. In this case, interactive choice is 
built upon Bayes rule. The equilibrium which is achieved by updating beliefs through 
Bayes rule (i.e. Bayesian equilibrium), is also a crucial aspect of game theory 
(Binmore, 1992), because it shows that rational players will make choices in the light 
of new observations and information about others’ actions (Mariotti, 1995).  
As game theory developed into more sophisticated repeated games and 
evolutionary models (e.g. Samuelson, 2002), the development of the economic man 
concept became more robust in predicting outcomes. Kreps, et al. (1982) indicated 
that even if the information is not complete, players could be cooperative if they 
believed that other players could obtain benefits from the cooperation and 
reciprocate. In addition, Conlon (2003) provided a game to show that people could be 
cooperative for an extremely long time, and the cooperation does not break down 
easily. Thus, in contrast to the purely “Crusoe-like” neo-classical economic man, the 
strategic economic man makes interactive choices given the actions of other players, 
rules and payoffs in a given context. 
Through game theory, models have shown that economic man could be altruistic 
and cooperative, imitating and learning from others. Banerjee (1992) demonstrated 
through a sequential decision model how each decision maker who observes the 
decisions made by previous players will imitate others if he thinks he will become 
better off by imitating. Besides this, two leading models of learning - Roth and Erev’s 
(1995) reinforcement learning model and Fudenberg and Levine’s (1995) belief-based 
learning model revealed that learning is motivated by self-interest (Feltovich 2000). In 
reinforcement learning models, players are not required to get the information of other 
players, because the cost of obtaining the information might be too high. Thus, a 
player does not need to form beliefs of what other players will do but would adjust his 
behavior according to the payoffs he earned before. If these payoffs are desirable, the 
player will reinforce the same behavior, but if they are undesirable, the player should 
adjust his behavior through the learning process. In contrast to the reinforcement 
learning models, Fudenberg and Levine (1995) indicated that the history of an 
opponent’s plays and the memory of players should be taken into account and when 
players hold beliefs of what other players might do, they will choose strategies on the 
basis of their beliefs and expected payoffs. Similar to Roth and Erev’s (1995) model, 
 5 
a player’s belief will be reinforced if his personal belief is consistent with other players’ 
behaviors. Thus, the evolved economic man is able to ameliorate his decision-making 
by learning. 
In addition, models of the economic man in the strategic age has investigated 
other issues as well e.g. value, social relationships and roles (Burns and Gomolin’ska, 
2000). Today, game theorists’ construction of the economic man is far more complex, 
integrating other elements such as social relationships, roles, values, norms, and 
beliefs through economic models.  
 
 
III 
 
Social Issues and Economic Man 
 
IN ECONOMICS, NORMS OR SOCIAL customs are often depicted as game rules 
that constrain the behavior of economic man. For instance, Akerlof (1980) 
incorporated elements such as reputation, obedience and disobedience of the 
community’s code of behavior into the utility function and explained why some social 
customs could exist, while others could not. As for norms, neo-classical economists 
assume that norms will not affect people’s decisions if they are irrelevant to 
behaviors. Nevertheless, some researchers have indicated that social norms will 
affect people’s social behaviors (Kallgren, Reno, and Cialdini, 2000). Today, more 
economists study the relationship between norms and economic actions. For 
example, Lindbeck (1997) introduces social norms into the utility function itself, 
instead of assuming that the norms constrain behaviors. He proposes that social 
norms could be taken as a reward in itself e.g. the rewards derived from being 
approving or disapproving of others, or even in terms of bringing about the feelings of 
pride or shame. Some organizational behaviors can also be explained by using the 
utility function as well. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) found that besides monetary 
incentives, employees’ identities with the organization also play a dominant role in 
work incentives.  
From the examples above, we can see that the components of the utility function 
of Homo Economicus have been expanded. Economists do take monetary benefits as 
the only components in the utility function; a content state of life and well-being is 
often achieved through economic means. Furthermore, incorporating social norms 
into utility functions do not contradict the self-interested assumption, since economic 
man still acts as a utility maximizer. In other words, economic man adheres to norms 
not because there is intrinsic worth within the norms that would override his utility 
function, but because by doing so he will increase his utility. Yet, no matter how many 
social elements go into the utility function, economic man is still self-interested. This is 
in contrast to the view of sociologists as presented below. 
 
 
IV 
 
Homo Sociologicus 
 
ELSTER (1989) STATED THAT ONE of the most significant cleavage in social 
science is the concepts of the Homo Economicus and the Homo Sociologicus. The 
concept of economic man stresses on individualistic preferences, while the concept of 
Homo Sociologicus stresses on the social notion of norms (Weale, 1992). Economic 
man is unencumbered by any personal relation (Grampp, 1948), while Homo 
Sociologicus is far more interdependent (Durkheim, 1893; Smelser and Swedberg, 
1994). Economic man is assumed to be perfectly rational, while Homo Sociologicus is 
not all rational (Boudon, 1982) and has to be a part of society (Durkheim, 1956). 
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Economic man is driven by self-interest, whereas Homo Sociologicus tries to fulfill his 
social role (Hirsch, Michaels, and Friedman, 1990; Weale, 1992). Thus, attributes 
such as interdependence, bounded rationality, learning, constructed by society and 
driven by norms, roles and relations draw us into an impression of traditional Homo 
Sociologicus.  
In the beginning of the 20th century, the development of social science depended 
largely on positivism. The scholars who held positivistic beliefs claimed that serious 
scientific arguments should be testable and falsified. Sociological methodology should 
rely on empirical means so as not to allow common sense or personal judgment to 
bias the research. Furthermore, the objectives of doing research are producing 
knowledge, explaining phenomena and predicting possible outcomes, and not to 
produce personal arguments. Husserl (1948), however, argued against this and took 
the position that human consciousness was the starting point to understanding 
objects. He claimed that the conscious experience is intentionally directed toward the 
object of its meaning (the reflection of the object), and the meaning is always charged 
with human’s conscious experiences (Hazelrigg, 1986). Only after meaning has been 
formed will humans be able to reconstitute the same object in their consciousness, 
and the whole object world is constituted by the communication between the self’s 
conscious experiences and the conscious experiences of others. Hence, an 
individual’s perception of reality of one object could be experienced differently by 
others. Yet, although the original conscious experience of each person might be 
different, it could become similar through communicating, learning, and sharing. In 
short, consciousness is a starting point through which communication enables human 
beings to perceive the world they are living in, and therefore hold similar standpoints 
to an object. This point of view was incorporated into constructionism, and 
constructionists propose that the nature of the world is constituted by people’s 
consciousness and experiences. 
In constructionism, social reality is therefore constructed by the people who are in 
turn constructed by the existing society. Therefore, the process of social 
contructionism is similar to historical analysis, where people can be defined in terms 
of previous social processes (Hacking, 1999). During this dynamic process, they are 
produced by the previous society and they will reproduce another society which will 
be inherited and reproduced again by them and others. Reality and knowledge are 
also derived from this process, and other conceptions such as class, roles, 
institutions, nations, communication, and economic behaviors are all socially 
constructed. Hence, Homo Sociologicus is a product of social processes and also an 
agent who is able to reconstruct social processes. During this construction process, 
certain roles will be gradually given to the Homo Sociologicus, and these roles will 
further define how he changes and reconstructs the society. Role is thus an important 
mechanism in social construction, because role defines how people interact with 
others, who they can interact with (that might determine what they can learn), and 
how they interpret and reconstruct this world. Thus, role could define and confine the 
means and scope of social construction. However, the function of role is very subtle. 
Turner (1956) defined role as a set of behaviors that could be regarded as a 
meaningful unit, and the meaningful unit makes the linkage between behaviors and 
roles that could be understood or could be expected by others. Dahrendorf (1968, 
p.6-7) further defined Homo Sociologicus as the bearer of socially predetermined 
roles. By obeying the obligations of the roles and by learning the expectations of the 
roles, Homo Sociologicus is able to become a part of society and build his social 
relationships with others. The meaning of role therefore relates to a particular status, 
position and a particular value in society. Furthermore, the concept of role focuses on 
man’s participation in an interactive process (Parsons and Shils, 1951), and not 
merely the status or positions of the role. Hence, it is more relevant to discuss how a 
role interacts with other roles than to discuss the status or position of the roles. In 
addition, role is a set of norms (Turner, 1956), and norms guide what Homo 
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Sociologicus should do and how he interacts with others (Thoits, 1992). Although 
Homo Sociologicus may not be willing to fulfill that role, he cannot relinquish his role 
without paying a price, because roles will create expected modes of behavior for the 
Homo Sociologicus, and there will be penalties if he fails to fulfill these expectations. 
Briefly speaking, Homo Sociologicus is neither purely self-interested nor perfectly 
rational; he is driven by social forces that are often beyond his control (Abell, 1991). 
The concept of Homo Sociologicus is widely used in sociological research today. 
Many of the research relate to the concept of role. For example, Callero (1985) 
conducted an empirical research of 658 subjects of blood donors, and found that the 
persons with high blood donor-identity salience would define themselves as regular 
blood donors, have stronger relationships with blood donation, and donate blood 
often. Another example is DeGarmo and Forgatch’s (2002) research on the impact of 
role identity salience to the family interaction in stepfamilies. Their research showed 
that negative interaction with a spouse who has a highly spousal (role) identity salient 
increases psychological distress, as opposed to when the spouse has low spousal 
identity salience. The central issue in Callero’s (1985) and DeGarmo and Forgatch’s 
(2002) works is that people’s actions significantly relate to the role identity salience.  
Apart from role identity salience, social identity theory is another issue that 
discusses the relationship between the individual’s behavior and social structure. 
However, social identity theory focuses on social categories such as nationality or 
marital status (Hogg, Terry, and White, 1995). In social identity theory, the individual 
is defined by the social category to which he belongs. Thus, an individual has no 
identity except for his membership within that category. Furthermore, a person’s 
social identity comes with his perceived membership in the social category (Hogg and 
Vaughan, 2002), and that social category provides stereotypical conduct and 
evaluation of each member. Social identity therefore affects the individual’s behavior, 
and individuals can therefore be described by their social identity.  
In summary, the concept of role identities and social identity both imply that the 
individual’s behavior is affected by social structure, and individuals themselves can 
also be categorized by these social categories (Stets and Burke, 2000). This, then, is 
the sociological man whose identity is defined by social elements such as roles. The 
concept of sociological man has had no significant change even in modern time. As 
Black (2000) commented, modern sociology is still classical sociology.  
As with economic man, Homo Sociologicus cannot eschew its philosophical 
problems. The first criticism of traditional Homo Sociologicus is on his propensity for 
not being self-interested. For example, how does Homo Sociologicus reconcile his 
self-interest and his social role? When Homo Sociologicus is struggling with his self-
interest and the obligation of his role, which one would he choose and to what extent 
will his choice be categorized? Since Homo Sociologicus may not be solely pursuing 
his selfish interests (Hirsch, Michaels, and Friedman, 1990), his behavior is far more 
complex and unpredictable. Wrong (1961) criticized the conception of man in modern 
sociology as being “over-socialized”, implying that man in sociology is overwhelmingly 
driven by rules. Furthermore, will the over-socialized conception possess enough 
power in explaining human being’s behaviors? For economists, normative 
expectations can be explained by using the assumptions of self-regarding, optimally 
chosen, individual actions (Abell, 1991). Some scholars such as Kahn, Lamm, and 
Nelson (1977), Messick and Sentis (1983) claimed that self-interest is still a 
motivation when facing different norms. Although Dahrendorf (1968) claimed that 
Homo Sociologicus still keeps his nature yet retains his freedom to act in a self-
interested manner, there seems no decision criterion to show how Homo Sociologicus 
makes choices between norms and individual self-interest.  
Another criticism is on the explanatory power of Homo Sociologicus in economic 
actions. Can the concept of Homo Sociologicus provide better explanations for 
economic actions than the economic man does? The sociologist Granovetter (1985), 
who reviewed classical economics, neo-classical economics, new institutional 
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economics, transaction cost economics, and sociology, propounded that people’s 
behavior are deeply affected by their social relations but that economic actions are 
embedded within social relations. Nonetheless, the socially constructed sociological 
man is far more complex than the economic man and is therefore difficult to be 
modeled. Incorporating one more social element (e.g. roles) into the concept of 
economic man will result in the whole structure of economics becoming extremely 
different and complicated.  
 
 
V 
 
Learning To Be Sociable  
 
AS HIRSCH, MICHAELS AND FRIEDMAN (1987) put it, “The most basic difference 
between economics and sociology concerns their assumptions about human nature” 
(p.322). Economic man is driven by self-interest, but the behavior of Homo 
Sociologicus is determined by his social role. Can economic man and Homo 
Sociologicus be reconciled? As discussed previously, economists such as Becker 
(1976, 1981), Lindbeck (1997), and Akerlof (1980, 2000) have adopted economic 
methodologies to research into social issues. Nonetheless, economic man and 
sociological man seem unable to be reconciled because the root of economics is the 
self-interest of each individual regardless of what his identity is. Thus, the atomistic 
nature of the economic man is a contradiction to the concept of Homo Sociologicus, 
where man and society is inseparable.  
The reason why the sociological man holds a fair amount of legitimacy comes from 
the critique of the economic man. While it is convenient to incorporate social values, 
norms and customs into an individual’s utility function or game rules, it is more 
problematic to try to explain why these social values, norms and customs matter in 
the first place. Also, it is left to the judgment of the modelers to choose which values, 
norms and customs should be included in the utility function; hence such elements 
may not be derived from the society in question but may be arbitrarily chosen. In 
other words, the economic man, and indeed, economics as a tool, is without values or 
judgment in the true spirit of Robbins (1945) and Mises (1996). Like mathematics, it is 
merely a tool to analyze economic society whereby the elements of what that society 
values is fed into it so that outcomes may be predicted, using an algorithm that is 
based on rationality and self-interest. Therefore as a tool, economics is not 
inadequate to make judgments on what is best for society, since what is best is 
predicated on what elements were brought in. Non-economic researchers often 
misunderstand the philosophy of economics, believing that it is one that assumes 
monetary and material benefits as the ultimate goal. In truth, economic philosophy is 
even less than that.  
Role behavior and Self interested. Role behavior can be explained within self-
interest economic behavior, even without factoring specifics into the utility function or 
game rules. In Keynes’ (1936) beauty contest, the best payoffs come from one who is 
able to predict the candidate that everyone else liked, and not based on one’s own 
judgment. Keynes wrote: “It is not a case of choosing those (faces) which, to the best 
of one’s judgment, are really the prettiest, nor even those which average opinion 
genuinely thinks the prettiest. We have reached the third degree where we devote our 
intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be. 
And there are some, I believe, who practice the fourth, fifth and higher degrees.” 
The meaning behind this gamble, as Keynes (1936) addressed, is that players’ 
choices are nothing to do with their own preferences, but relate to collective choices 
and their ability to predict or choose the collective choice. In other words, social 
consideration goes into game theory framework, and we see why an economic man 
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could follow collective choices or norms without contradicting his self-interest 
assumptions. 
Interactive choice and iterated models of learning and thinking (Camerer, and Ho, 
1999; Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2003, 2004) could also be viewed as antecedents to 
role behavior expounded in sociology. In contrast to economic models that 
incorporate social or ethical values within their utility functions, different types of 
seemingly socialized behavior can result from the individual’s perceived differences in 
the degree of rationality of other players when the collective choice is necessary to 
maximize the payoff of individuals. Thus, players need to devote their social 
intelligence to anticipate what others might do on the basis of their historical or 
cultural choices. When the best outcome can only be achieved by having a choice 
that is predicated on collective choices, a rational player who makes his choice 
according to the collective choice may be seen as playing a “role”, while retaining his 
self- interested orientation. 
The self in Self-interest. Homo Economicus assumes that man is atomistically 
self-interested with distinct and discrete boundaries (an obvious positivistic 
inclination), an assumption that sociology researchers consider naïve. Hence, 
economists are prone to analyzing the self-interest atomistically, with the actions of 
the self interacting with (e.g. games), or driven by (e.g. social values in utility function) 
society. Sociologists, on the other hand, see the self and the society as inseparable. 
Could there be an argument for the “self” in the self-interested economic man, as that 
which is embedded within the society as according to sociologists?  
If so, it can be argued that the inseparability of self and society is not in conflict 
with the notion of the economic man. While sociology is concerned with the role and 
identity of Man, economics on the other hand is not. Economics does not provide the 
philosophical notion of what Man is. One could then argue that Man, when interacting 
with or is driven by society, even in an atomistic fashion, “loses” its atomistic nature 
and becomes sociological man i.e. a self defined by society. Thus, the outcomes 
predicted by economists do not provide inferences on the philosophical assumptions 
of Man, but merely on how he behaves driven by what he values. By bringing social 
norms and values into the individual’s utility function, it can be argued that this could 
be the same as the inseparability of self and society, particularly when how self and 
society interacts is not specified in sociology. By looking at the choice of an individual 
that seem like that he is performing a “role”, although it could be that the interactive 
choice is motivated by self-interest, an individual is both Homo Economicus and 
Homo Sociologicus.  
For example, Cooley’s (1902) “Looking-glass Self” theory described the self as not 
being first individual and then social, and that self and society are inseparable from 
each other, with that unity achieved through communication. In Cooley’s work, selves 
cannot be isolated from society because self builds society, and society forms a mind 
of self. As Cooley said, “There is no sense of I without its correlative sense of you, or 
he, or they.” 
While sociologists such as Cooley are interested in the definition of self, 
economics is more concerned with the choices made by the individual. In other 
words, it’s all well and good how an individual perceives himself, but ultimately, how 
does he make the choice, given the identity he has and the scarcity of resources? 
Economics does not have a definition for self. It merely suggests a tool based on self-
interest, and it has left the researcher free to decide what exactly that self is 
interested in. In addition, modern interactive economics is not keen to understand the 
definition of the self, but to predict what this “self” would do. It hence provides the 
methodology for understanding that interaction so that outcomes can be predicted. 
Since sociology does not provide answers to how self and society interacts, it cannot 
be said that the two (self and society) are irreconcilable.  
Finally, the purpose of the economic man is to predict his behavior and look at the 
interactive choices he has to make within the society in which he functions, 
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considering the scarcity of resources. The purpose of the sociological man is to 
identify who he is, how he interacts with people within a society, and the antecedents 
to such behaviors. Homo Economicus therefore has no overarching philosophical 
assumptions on what he values, nor are economists interested to seek its ontology. 
The objectives of each discipline are different and once one is mapped on to the 
other, it is unclear if there is truly any tension between them. 
 
 
VI 
 
The Future of Economic Man 
 
OUR PAPER  INVESTIGATES THE DISCOURSE OF economic articles over the past 
century. Homo Economicus that began with philosophical assumptions of Man has 
evolved into an algorithm to predict outcomes dependent on the economist’s 
assumption of what the individual values. Homo Economicus, therefore, has lost its 
philosophical and ontological origins and could even be, in terms of how he behaves, 
a sociological man. The difference between Homo Economicus and Homo 
Sociologicus is therefore not the assumptions of human nature, contrary to Hirsch et 
al. Indeed, economics, as far as the modern economic game-playing interactive man 
is concerned, does not have any assumptions about human nature; it merely 
presumes that an individual is self-interested. 
Yet, even as an algorithmic tool to predict behavior, a further point requires 
consideration. When making an interactive choice, the concept of the “other” in the 
interaction is also up for negotiation. Interactive choices in game theory assumes the 
“other” as one who is identical to the individual, and who hold the same utility function 
to be true. This does not have to be, i.e. game theoretic axiom of i≠j could be taken 
much more broadly than it is currently and different players could have different utility 
functions in an interactive game. Clearly, equilibrium outcomes would change and be 
vastly different, but would not contradict the basic assumptions of the algorithm. 
By using the concept of economic man, economists have successfully explained 
how free rider problems can be alleviated by clarifying property right (Olson, 1965), 
and why good cars would be driven out from market and only lemons are left (Akerlof, 
1970). Other issues such as differentiating insurance premiums (Stiglitz, 1976), 
governance structures (Williamson, 1975, 1979, 1985), and public choice theory 
(Brennan and Buchanan, 1988) are also based on the idea of economic man, a 
testimony to the robustness of the concept. However, it is important to recognize that 
Homo Economicus is an algorithm in which the inputs have to be philosophically, 
sociologically and culturally grounded. Hence, excursions into anthropology, 
psychology, sociology, and philosophy could be very helpful for economists to obtain 
a more comprehensive view of human behavior.  
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